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INTRODUCTION: THE IMPORTANCE OF A REMEDY
T hirty years have passed since the discovery of Thorazine, a neurolep-
tic drug,' and the drugging of American state mental patients has
become commonplace. All our state hospitals rely heavily on neurolep-
tics, 2 and the general public has long since been educated about the deci-
sive role of drugs in public policy toward the seriously mentally-ill. Yet it
was not until 1975,s with the advent of "right to-refuse-treatment" law-
suits, that courts seriously confronted mental hospital drug problems, and
the legal issues raised then remain open. In 1982 the Supreme Court re-
manded two right-to-refuse-drug cases without reaching the merits of
either.4
These lawsuits have proved unusually contentious.5 On the one hand,
the fiscal, administrative, and human consequences of limiting drug use
by court fiat would be far-reaching and, many argue, disastrous. These
drugs are the mainstay of present-day public mental-health services.'
They are credited with preserving order in state hospitals, reducing the
population of hospitals, facilitating other psychiatric treatments, and
making "community care" for the mentally ill a reality.7 At the same
"Neuroleptic" refers to a family of drugs that are also known as "major tranquilizers"
or "antipsychotics." Because of the neuroleptics' unique effects and side effects, they de-
serve-and have received-attention apart from that paid to other drugs, such as lithium
and antidepressants, that are used in mental hospitals. See Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650,
653 n.1 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. -, 102
S. Ct. 2442 (1982). Thorazine was the first of these drugs to be marketed in the United
States, in 1953. See generally J. SWAZEY, CHLORPROMAZINE IN PSYCHIATRY: A STUDY OF
THERAPEUTIC INNOVATION (1974) (an enthusiastic account of Thorazine's discovery and use
in the United States during the mid-1950's).
See generally Crane, Clinical Psychopharmacology in Its Twentieth Year, 181 Sci-
ENCE 124 (1973) (discussion of the role of neuroleptics in mental health care, their side ef-
fects and professional attitudes toward them).
' That year marked the filing of-and grant of preliminary injunctive relief in-Rogers
v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded, 634
F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. __,
102 S. Ct. 2442 (1982).
Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 2442 (1982); Rennie v. Klein, __ U.S.
., 102 S. Ct. 3506 (1982).
Compare Appelbaum & Gutheil, "Rotting With Their Rights On": Constitutional
Theory and Clinical Reality in Drug Refusal By Psychiatric Patients, 7 BULL. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & LAW 306 (1979) (supporting the use and effectiveness of drugs and question-
ing what patients really win in right-to-refuse lawsuits) with Cole, Patients' Rights vs. Doc-
tors' Rights: Which Should Take Precedence?, in REFUSING TREATMENT IN MENTAL INSTITU-
TIONS-VALUES IN CONFLICT 56 (1982) (the Rogers plaintiff's lawyer addressing the patients'
position in such lawsuits).
' See generally J. SWAZEY, supra note 1; Crane, supra note 2; Shavill, Patients' Rights
v. Patients' Needs: The Right of the Mentally Ill to Refuse Treatment in Colorado, 58 DEN.
L.J. 567 (1981) (wide-spread use of drugs in the treatment of mental patients).
7 See sources cited supra note 6; Bassuk & Gerson, Deinstitutionalization and Mental
Health Services, 231 SCI. AM. 46 (1978).
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time, however, the drugs inflict physical and mental harms on a broad
scale-a scale perhaps unprecedented in modern law. It is not uncommon
for the drugs to cause anxiety,8 subjective torment,9 zombiism,' ° health-
threatening physical complications, 1 and a permanent partial loss of mo-
tor control 2 in those who receive them.
This is no simple matter of the integrity of a bureaucratic system ver-
sus the physical and mental integrity of individuals, however. For many
of the mentally ill, drugs reduce the intensity of psychotic symptoms,' 3
relieve some of the distress of naturally-occurring mental illness, 4 and
prolong the intervals between acute psychotic relapses. 5 Moreover, it is
arguable that the mentally ill, as a class, benefit because drugging has
rendered state hospital confinement safer and made community treat-
ment settings possible.
For a variety of reasons, questions of legal remedy' 6-as opposed to the
doctrinal issue of the existence vel non of a constitutional right to refuse
these drugs-deserve close attention. First, given the seriousness and high
incidence of drug side effects, it is almost inconceivable that the Consti-
tution does not speak to the issue and limit drugging in some way; thus,
patients' entitlement to some measure of constitutional protection seems
a foregone conclusion. As questions of "right" fade in importance, issues
of remedy necessarily come to the foreground. Indeed, more than one
court has downplayed the question of a textual, constitutional source for
the right to refuse drugs;' 7 in the views of these courts, the existence of
8 Van Putten & Mutalipassi, Fluphenazine Enanthate Induced Decompensations, 16
PSYCHOSOMATICS 37, 38-39 (1975).
9 Van Putten & May, Subjective Response As a Predictor of Outcome in
Pharmachotherapy: The Consumer Has a Point, 35 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 477, 478-79
(1978).
" Rifkin, Quitkin & Klein, Akinesia: A Poorly Recognized Drug-Induced Ex-
trapyramidal Behavioral Disorder, 32 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 672, 673 (1975).
" Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1138 (D.N.J. 1978), class injunction issued, 476
F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979), modified, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc), vacated and
remanded, __ U.S. ___ 102 S. Ct. 3506 (1982), on remand, No. 79-2576 (filed Oct. 13,
1983) (en bane).
12 See infra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
"3 Brooks, The Constitutional Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Medications, 8 BULL. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & LAW 179, 182-83 (1980).
14 Appelbaum & Gutheil, supra note 5, at 307.
' Hogarty, Goldberg, Schooler & Ulrich, Drugs and Sociotherapy in the Aftercare of
Schizophrenic Patients, 31 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 603 (1974); May, Turns, Yale, Potepan
& Dixon, Schizophrenia-A Follow-up Study of Results of Treatment, 33 ARCH. GEN. PSY-
CHIATRY 481 (1976).
6 On the nature of legal remedies in what has been called "institutional" or "public law"
litigation, see the authorities cited infra notes 27 and 30.
" See, e.g., Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 844 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc), vacated and
remanded, __ U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 3506 (1982), on remand, No. 79-2576 (filed Oct. 13,
1983) (en banc); Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 653 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded
sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 2442 (1982).
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some right is clear, and it matters little whether "privacy, '" 8 the first
amendment, 9 the liberty protected by the fourteenth amendment,20 or
some other constitutional provision2 is the source of that right.
A second reason for focusing on remedies relates to the pivotal role of
the drugs in state psychiatry. Even if a right to refuse drugs exists, courts
are not about to decree the state mental hospitals into a state of chaos by
casually imposing too far-reaching a remedy. Nor, given the threat of in-
dividual torment and physical deformity from drugging, are courts about
to announce casually an ineffective remedy. The competing interests are
such that judges will not be content to declare the existence of a right and
leave the rest of society to accommodate to that new right as best it can;
rather, judges will want to fine-tune the remedy in light of its individual,
bureaucratic, and society-wide effects.
Moreover, there are special features in the mental hospital setting that
make judges unusually sensitive to issues of remedy and social impact.
State mental hospitals are relatively closed, discrete systems, and, in such
a social context, the results of court intervention may easily be both pro-
nounced and-at least by comparison-readily ascertainable. One might
wonder about the social effects of a constitutional ruling on the scope of
the first amendment, for instance, but the effects of a judicial decision
allowing mental patients to refuse drugs will be only too obvious-or so it
seems. The pronounced impact of a judicial decree in this setting is the
third reason why courts closely attend to the question of remedy.
Finally, the courts are unusually solicitous of the welfare of the men-
tally ill in state hospitals." Whether the mentally ill deserve to be singled
out in this way and whether they in fact benefit from this special consid-
eration are different questions; but the fact is that courts are unlikely to
impose a remedy that-in the judge's eyes-worsens the overall lot of the
mentally ill. To return to the example given above, courts may accord
first amendment protection to forms of expression even if, in their opin-
ion, the speaker will be made somewhat more miserable as a result.23
However, courts will not so readily apply the Constitution to impair the
quality of life of the mentally ill. Thus, assessing the social impact of a
remedy in this area is a matter of the first importance.
Despite their importance, the discussion of remedies for state hospital
18 E.g., Rennie, 462 F. Supp. at 1144.
19 E.g., id. at 1143.
'0 E.g., Rennie, 653 F.2d at 844.
" E.g., Symonds, Mental Patients' Right to Refuse Drugs: Involuntary Medication as
Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 7 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 701 (1980); cf. Rennie, 653 F.2d at
844 (eighth amendment inappropriate as a basis for non-criminal mental patients' constitu-
tional rights).
22 See, e.g., Rennie, 653 F.2d at 844; Brotman, Behind the Bench in Rennie v. Klein, in
REFUSING TREATMENT IN MENTAL INSTITUTIONS-VALUES IN CONFLICT 31, 40-41 (1982).
23 See, R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 190-92 (1977).
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drugging has been largely ad hoc and uninformed.24 This study attempts
to fill that gap. It explores four such remedies, attempting to identify the
vision of the drug problem that underlies each one; to evaluate that vision
and its plausibility; and to determine what the actual effects of imposing
the remedy would be. All of the remedies examined exhibit serious flaws,
I believe.
Part I distinguishes between two approaches to remedy-"structural"
and "atomistic"-and, as a basis for testing the two, describes a state
hospital's handling of the most serious drug side effect. This account also
provides a sense of the dimensions of the drugging problems in state
hospitals.
Part II explores a family of atomistic remedies. These would address
drugging problems by seeking to ensure that state doctors are knowledge-
able about drugs and/or reasonably careful in administering them. I reject
this approach because it flies in the face of the realities of state drug-
ging-as described in Part I-and promises no relief for state patients.
Part III explores a rather different kind of atomistic remedy, one
which conditions drugging on either the patient's competent consent or,
assuming the patient is incompetent, on the prosecution of full-fledged
incompetency proceedings and the subsequent consent of a guardian. I
argue that this remedy promises to be ineffective too, though for some-
what different reasons.
Part IV discusses a structural remedy that looks beyond the narrow
confines of the state doctor-patient relationship and uses commitment
hearings as a vehicle for ensuring that post-commitment drugging com-
ports with high medical standards. Although an elegant and internally
coherent scheme, I argue that it imposes an untenable choice on society
in practice and will prove futile or worse in operation.
Part V analyzes another structural remedy, though one with a different
vision of the problem and a different solution to it. In Rennie v. Klein, 5
the district judge developed an elaborate procedural system to address
what he perceived to be the organizational root of state hospital drugging
excesses.26 This section attempts to show, however, that the theory under-
24 See, e.g., Rennie, 653 F.2d at 850; but see id. at 865-70 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
20 Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979), modified, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir.
1981) (en banc), vacated and remanded, - U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 3506 (1982), on remand,
No. 79-2576 (filed Oct. 13, 1983) (en banc).
"0 Rennie, 476 F. Supp. at 1311-15. Although the court of appeals overturned the proce-
dures Judge Brotman established, other federal court consent decrees have adopted Brot-
man's work as a model. E.g., ORDER APPROVING PLAN FOR INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF DISPUTED
PSYCHIATRIC/MEDICATIoN DECISIONS, Davis v. Hubbard, No. C73-205 (N.D. Ohio May 18,
1981) (reported at 15 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 528 (1981)). Moreover, these procedures have
received wide praise. See Brooks, supra note 13, at 182-83; Note, Involuntary Commitment
and the Right to Refuse Treatment with Anti-Psychotic Drugs, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 719,
741 (1983); Stone, The Right to Refuse Treatment: Why Psychiatrists Should and Can
Make It Work, 38 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 358 (1981). "Rennie ... reflects the efforts of a
1983-84]
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lying this solution to the problem is mistaken and that, as a result, the
system simply did not work when put into place.
I. STRUCTURAL AND ATOMISTIC APPROACHES: THE CASE OF TARDIVE
DYSKINESIA
State hospital drugging can be approached either by focusing on the
state doctor-patient relationship or by looking to the forces that arguably
shape that relationship. The first approach I call "atomistic" because it
views the doctor-patient relationship as the irreducible unit of legal anal-
ysis, regarding it as something entirely independent of its social, political,
and professional setting. The second approach, generally called "struc-
tural," presupposes that the problems in state hospital drugging are at-
tributable to organizational, bureaucratic, or structural conditions that
constrain the actions of individual state doctors.2
For each of these views there is a corresponding type of remedy. Atom-
istic remedies are directed at the doctor-patient relationship and usually
seek to ensure that the relationship is actually in place. Structural reme-
dies address the supposed underlying constraints on doctors' drugging
decisions.
Atomistic views and remedies have an intuitive appeal in the state
mental hospital context. In ostensibly medical settings, it is natural to
look to the competence and conscience of a physician-and no fur-
ther-as such views do. Moreover, an atomistic approach better comports
with the position of courts in our society. A judge who reasons from the
nature of the doctor-patient relationship remains well within bounds of
traditional adjudication, while a judge who speculates about the deeper
causes of social phenomena may appear to be over-stepping the judicial
role.28 Thus, the atomistic approach deals in concepts which are amenable
to constitutional analysis.
Since mental hospital controversies lend themselves so well to atomistic
thoughtful judge attempting to balance rights against needs." Id. at 360.
Dr. Stone's view of the decree is of particular interest. He served as President of the
American Psychiatric Association (A.P.A.) when the A.P.A. filed an amicus brief urging the
Third Circuit to overturn the district court's Rennie injunction. Brief of the American Psy-
chiatric Association as Amicus Curiae, Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981) [herein-
after cited as Amicus Brief]. Yet in the cited article, Dr. Stone-writing on his own behalf
and not for the Association-observed that "if the facts were as . . .[Judge Brotman] por-
trayed them"-and no serious question about the fact findings was ever raised-"he was
certainly correct" in requiring second opinions by qualified psychiatrists, that being at the
heart of the decree. Stone, supra note 26, at 360.
7 See Chayes, The Supreme Court 1981 Term-Foreword: Public Law Litigation and
the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1982) (discussion of the Court's involvement in
structural reform of various institutions); Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term-Foreword:
The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979) (institutional reform and the Court).
28 Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978); Mishkin
Federal Courts as State Reformers, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 949 (1978).
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approaches in these ways, it is ironic that the courts' sensitivity to mental
hospital remedies29 dictates close judicial attention to the real causes and
limits of overreaching in this area-a circumstance that may impel the
court toward a structural approach. Moreover, despite the attractions of
atomism, social phenomena do not necessarily arrange themselves so as to
afford ease or manageability in judicial analysis, and the facts of mental
hospital life may make an atomistic model or viewpoint untenable.
Indeed mental hospital drugging does not conform to atomistic stric-
tures. The salient aspects of state drugging practices simply cannot be
explained in terms of lapses from the state doctor-patient relationship;
entirely different forces appear to be at work, or so I shall argue. This
appears most clearly from a representative state hospital system's posture
toward the most serious potential side effect of the drugs-tardive
dyskinesia.
A. Tardive Dyskinesia: The Disorder
Although neuroleptics cause numerous distressing side effects,3"
one-called tardive dyskinesia-is generally regarded with the most con-
cern. It is common, affecting perhaps twenty percent of drugged pa-
tients."s In advanced cases its symptoms render the patient's appearance
bizarre 2 and-unlike other drug sequelae-it is often irreversible, not
abating after drugs are discontinued.3
Tardive dyskinesia's symptoms resemble those of naturally-occurring
" See supra text accompanying notes 17-23.
10 See R. BALDESSARINI, CHEMOTHERAPY IN PSYCHIATRY (1977); American College of
Neuropsychopharmacology-Food and Drug Administration Task Force, Neurological Syn-
dromes Associated With Antipsychotic Drug Use, 28 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 463, 463
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Task Force]; Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeutic Orgy: Mental
Patients' Right to Refuse Treatment, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 461, 474-79 (1978). The side effects
include anxiety and inability to remain still ("akathesia"); lack of will, drive, or energy ("ak-
inesia"); tremor, stiffness, and shuffling gait (pseudo-parkinsonism); physical complications;
and the inducement of subjective states that may range from mildly unpleasant to unbear-
ably tormented. Regarding these subjective states, see Alarcon & Carney, Severe Depressive
Mood Changes Following Slow Release Intramuscular Fluphenazine Injection, 1969 BRIT.
MED. J. 564; Opton, Psychiatric Violence Against Prisoners: When Therapy Is Punish-
ment, 46 Miss. L.J. 605, 641 (1974); Van Putten & May, supra note 9; Van Putten &
Mutalipassi, supra note 8; cf. Rennie, 653 F.2d at 844 n.9 and sources cited therein (possible
link between psychotropic drugs and suicidal depression).
" Gardos & Cole, Overview: Public Health Issues in Tardive Dyskinesia, 137 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 776, 776 (1980); Jeste & Wyatt, Changing Epidemiology of Tardive Dyskinesia:
An Overview, 138 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 297, 300-01, 307-09 (1981) (citing published studies).
See generally AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, TARDIVE DYSKINESIA: REPORT OF THE
TASK FORCE ON LATE NEUROLOGICAL EFFECTS OF ANTIPSYCHOTIC DRUGS (1.979) (a general
study undertaken at about the same time that the pending right-to-refuse-drugs cases began
attracting public attention).
" Rennie, 462 F. Supp. at 1138.
s Id.; see also authorities cited supra note 31.
1983-84]
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brain diseases such as Huntington's chorea or Wilson's disease. 4 Charac-
teristically, there are incessant abnormal movements of the face, limbs,
and occasionally the trunk. In the area of the mouth, tardive dyskinesia
causes the tongue to protrude, the jaw to move from side to side, and the
lips to pucker or extend themselves. Comparable movements may affect
the fingers, hands, ankles or torso; indeed, it is not clear that any part of
the body is immune. 5 Cases of tardive dyskinesia vary in severity; some
are so mild as to be almost unnoticeable while others are physically
disabling.
More than anything else, tardive dyskinesia's irreversibility makes it
unique among the drug side effects. Drug-induced distress, pacing, trem-
ors, stiffness, and blank expressions can also reach severe proportions,
but these conditions either abate with continued drugging, respond in
some measure to so-called antiparkinsonian medications, or disappear
when-and if-drugging stops.3 6 By contrast, tardive dyskinesia's perma-
nence means that the decision to drug can touch the rest of one's life.
3 7
B. Assessing the State Hospitals' Response
The response to tardive dyskinesia affords a window into the processes
of state psychiatry and illustrates fairly-albeit dramatically-the
problems of drugging in state hospitals. As the most seriously-regarded
side effect of the drugs, this disorder is an important test of hospital pa-
ternalism. Hospitals unwilling or unable to diagnose it are still less likely
to diagnose other side effects accurately-effects arguably less worthy of
attention and more easily overlooked. For these reasons, an examination
of the response of state physicians to tardive dyskinesia promises to be
instructive about atomistic and structural remedies and the limitations of
each.
1. Sources of Information
To my knowledge there have been only two even modestly systematic
attempts to look beyond research settings and to describe state physi-
cians' actual postures in the face of the symptoms of tardive dyskinesia.
One is the work of Dr. George Crane,38 who surveyed a number of state
3' Crane, Tardive Dyskinesia in Patients Treated With Major Neuroleptics: A Review
of the Literature, 124 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 40, 45 (Supp. 1968).
3 See authorities cited supra note 31.
Rennie, 462 F. Supp. at 1138.
Although tardive dyskinesia is generally regarded as the drugs' most serious side ef-
fect, Rennie, 653 F.2d at 843, I believe that patients often view the subjective sequelae of
drugging with greater horror. However that may be, tardive dyskinesia is certainly serious
enough to warrant close attention and extreme caution.
" Dr. Crane was the leading force in gaining recognition for tardive dyskinesia among
academic psychiatrists in the late 1960's and early 1970's. See Crane, supra note 2; Crane,
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hospital systems in the 1970's and found that state physicians as a rule
ignored both the disorder and its symptoms.3 9 According to Crane, hospi-
tal charts neither diagnosed obvious cases nor even acknowledged the ob-
vious symptoms which may accompany the disorder; this neglect of a seri-
ous iatrogenic disorder was "unprecedented" in modern medicine, Crane
concluded. 40
The other source- of information about tardive dyskinesia in the state
hospital setting is the Rennie v. Klein trial record."' A class action right-
to-refuse-drug case involving all of New Jersey's state hospitals, Rennie
documented this large state system's response to tardive dyskinesia
through the year 1978, when the trial ended. The picture that emerges is
the one painted by Crane: a virtually total refusal by state physicians,
bureaucrats, and consultants to acknowledge tardive dyskinesia or its
symptoms. Moreover, Rennie depicted the response of state hospitals
when tardive dyskinesia or its symptoms were, despite everything,
pointed out; the lengths to which doctors went in order to discredit those
who told the truth about the disorder is remarkable and revealing.
2. Objections to Reliance on the Rennie Record
Before turning to the Rennie record, some possible objections to its use
deserve attention. One might attempt to explain the record away, arguing
for example that tardive dyskinesia was a little-known condition in the
1970's-one with which ordinary mental hospital doctors, acting in all
good faith, might be unfamiliar. However, tardive dyskinesia has been a
focal point of psychiatric concern about drugging since, at the latest,
supra note 34; Crane, Tardive Dyskinesia in Schizophrenic Patients Treated With Psycho-
tropic Drugs, in 2ND INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON ACTION, MECHANISM AND METABOLISM OF
PSYCHOTROPIC DRUGS DERIVED FROM PHENOTHIAZINES AND STRUCTURALLY RELATED COM-
POUNDS 209 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Crane, Tardive Dyskinesia]; see also United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Joint Appendix at 1087a-88a, Rennie v. Klein, 653
F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981) (testimony of Dr. Crane) [hereinafter cited as Joint Appendix].
" Joint Appendix, supra note 38, at 1087a.
40 Id. at 1093a.
" 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978), class injunction issued, 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J.
1979). Initiated in 1977 as an individual mental patient's action for injunctive relief in drug-
ging matters, Rennie subsequently became a class action involving the drug refusal rights of
every New Jersey mental hospital patient. See the text accompanying notes 136-63 for a
discussion of the Rennie decisions and see the note accompanying the title of this article for
an explanation of my involvement in the case. At this point in this article the case is of
interest because it develops the fullest portrait available of actual state hospital drugging
practices. Compare, e.g., Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979) (another fed-
eral class action right-to-refuse-drug decision). In Rogers proof focused on fewer 10 patient-
litigants who were identified as such to state physicians and who-not surpris-
ingly-suffered no serious drug reactions during the litigation. Neither Rogers nor other
cases known to me other than Rennie purport to give an overall picture of state hospital
drug use and the actual evidence of side effects. See also infra note 52 and accompanying
text (the medical literature about actual state drug practices is almost non-existent).
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1972, when drug package inserts were reformulated and major medical
journals alerted the psychiatric profession to the dangers of tardive dys-
kinesia.43 Moreover, as will appear, the New Jersey hospitals claimed to
know all along about tardive dyskinesia; they simply refused to acknowl-
edge that any of their patients suffered from it.
43
Again, one might argue that tardive dyskinesia is sui generis among
drug side effects and that doctors' disdain for it does not mean that they
ignore other harmful sequelae. It is true that some other side effects have
been more readily acknowledged than tardive dyskinesia. However, it
would be a serious indictment of state psychiatry indeed if the most seri-
ous drug side effect, and that one alone, was ignored. Moreover, the possi-
bility that state doctors ignored tardive dyskinesia-presumably because
of its very seriousness and implications for future drug use 44-but paid
close attention to other serious drug side effects is remote. At the least,
one could conclude that the more serious the drug side effect the more
likely it will be ignored.
Probably the most important possible objection, however, is that New
Jersey hospitals themselves are sui generis and not representative of what
occurs in other state hospital systems. Indeed, the American Psychiatric
Association, which acknowledged the serious abuses in the Rennie record,
adopted this approach.45 This objection is misplaced for two reasons.
First, something must be done with New Jersey and other state sys-
tems-should there be any-that exhibit New Jersey's abuses. At a mini-
mum, then, "good" state systems must be distinguished from "bad" ones
and some remedy must be tailored for the latter cases. Abuses should not
be ignored merely because they are less than universal.
More basically, however, there is every reason to regard New Jersey as
typical of other states. Nothing in the New Jersey hospitals' history, or-
ganization, or approach suggests they are unique.46 Indeed, physicians
transfer from state hospital to state hospital-within and across state
lines-and it does not appear that any physician ever regarded New
Jersey's hospitals as unusual. New Jersey hospitals enjoy accreditation
from the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals.4 7 Moreover, the
picture that the Rennie record paints accords precisely with Dr. Crane's
4 See, e.g., Task Force, supra note 30.
" See infra notes 50-67 and accompanying text.
" See Rennie, 476 F. Supp. at 1302-03.
" Amicus Brief, supra note 26, at 18-22.
" In Rennie outside exerts testified that New Jersey's mental hospitals were typical of
large state institutions in general appearance and operation. See, e.g., Joint Appendix, supra
note 38, at 1593a, 1082a (testimony of Drs. Mosher and Crane).
"7 One of the state hospitals, Trenton Psychiatric, lost the accreditation of the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals in 1975 and regained it in 1981; problems with
the physical plant appear to have been the primary deaccreditation consideration. See
Brief on Behalf of Appellants/Cross-Appellees Douglas J. Cospito at 6-7, Cospito v.
Califano, Nos. 83-5201, 83-5202 (3d Cir. 1983).
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findings in the other state hospital systems. s There is no study, to my
knowledge, showing that state doctors have ever forthrightly acknowl-
edged tardive dyskinesia or allowed it to restrict their drugging of the
mentally ill.49
In sum, attitudes of state physicians toward tardive dyskinesia should
be indicative of their attitudes toward all drug-caused harms, and New
Jersey doctors' attitudes in this regard-as disclosed by Rennie-should
be representative of state psychiatry's.
C. Tardive Dyskinesia in a State Hospital System
1. The Surveys: 1974 and 1978
In 1974, tardive dyskinesia attracted more attention from New Jersey
residents than it ever had before-or would, in the near future at least,
attract again. The attention it commanded in that year came not from
state doctors, at least not in the first instance, but from newspaper read-
ers. Two social workers had issued a widely-reported press release charg-
ing that "permanent neurological disorders [i.e. tardive dyskinesia] have
become common" in the state's mental hospitals.50 That claim-indeed,
the language of the press release-echoed an article Dr. Crane had pub-
lished the year before in Science magazine.5 The social workers' allega-
tions were certainly true: New Jersey patients, like drugged patients eve-
rywhere, fell victim to tardive dyskinesia.
The state mental hospital system did not take these charges lightly, or
so a counter-press release made it appear.5 2 The head of New Jersey's
mental health system, Ann Klein, quickly announced the commissioning
of an "independent" study by faculty members at the New Jersey College
of Medicine and Dentistry to investigate the charges. 3 This independent
investigation was necessary, Commissioner Klein said, to address the
"anxieties" that the social workers' "serious charges [had] created in the
minds of the public, the patients and their families. '5 4
In short order, independent surveyors reported that they had "found
no evidence of permanent neurological damage due to drug ther-
apy" 5 5-the first in what was to become a series of official denials that
'8 Joint Appendix, supra note 38, at 1087a.
4' Generally, the medical (and, one might add, legal) literature pays little attention to
"actual prescription practices in mental hospitals." Mason, Nerviano & DeBurger, Patterns
of Antipsychotic Drug Use in Four Southeastern State Hospitals, 1977 DISEASES OF THE
NERVOUS SYSTEM 541, 541.
Joint Appendix, supra note 38, at 791b.
6' See Crane, supra note 2.
Joint Appendix, supra note 38, at 772b.
5S Id.
54 Id.
" Id. at 771b.
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tardive dyskinesia existed within the state. The conclusion itself, which, if
taken at face value, was inherently incredible-indeed, ridiculous-was
no less remarkable than the surveyors' means of arriving at it. The inde-
pendent doctors had been described as "surveyors,"56 and although they
did in fact visit hospitals, their investigation of tardive dyskinesia con-
sisted entirely of sending questionnaires to hospital physicians and re-
viewing patient charts that the mental hospitals themselves had provided.
Since, as the study itself demonstrated, the mental hospitals had never
diagnosed tardive dyskinesia, the surveyors learned of no cases from their
charts and questionnaires; they could then report that they had found
"no evidence of it."'5 7
It is simply inconceivable that these academic doctors would be unin-
formed about tardive dyskinesia or would be unable to recognize it, if
they had wished to. Although tardive dyskinesia did not dominate the
medical journals in 1974, it had received wide academic recognition by
then and, as noted above, drug manufacturers and psychiatric leaders had
issued special warnings about it within the previous two years. The social
workers themselves had obviously learned of it in Dr. Crane's Science
magazine" article published the year before.
The political, legal, and moral consequences of this incident-and simi-
lar ones that would follow it-are serious. The physical damage done to
thousands of patients was ignored, and the government misrepresented
its actions: it claimed it was not deforming mental patients, when it was.
Moreover, the government had enlisted doctors not just from its own hos-
pitals, but the respected leaders of the state medical school in construct-
ing its official version of the truth about drugs.
Not the least-remarkable thing about the 1974 survey was its repetition
in essentially the same format and with essentially the same results four
years later, in 1978.' 9 Klein had commissioned a second drug survey in
the wake of the Rennie case,60 which was filed in December 1977 and was
receiving District Judge Brotman's close attention. This second survey
was performed by high-ranking officials in the state mental health bu-
reaucracy (rather than by the state medical college) and it was to have "a
specific concern as to the identification of cases of tardive dyskinesia."'
The 1978 surveyors chose the so-called "format"6 2 of the earlier investi-
gation: that is to say, they reviewed charts without examining any pa-
tients. Once again, the surveyors reported that "[n]o case of tardive dys-
as Id.
57 Id.
11 Crane, supra note 2.
59 Joint Appendix, supra note 38, at 264b.
60 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978).
6 Joint Appendix, supra note 38, at 289b-91b.
62 Id.
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kinesia was uncovered,"63 attributing these "favorable findings" to "the
aggressive in-house educational program Ancora Psychiatric Hospital had
had relative to the use of antipsychotic medication ... ."" Ancora was
the focal point of the second survey and, not coincidentally, of the Rennie
suit. The same hospital performed a drug "audit" at about this time, re-
porting a by-now-familiar conclusion to the Joint Commission on Accred-
itation of Hospitals: not a single case of tardive dyskinesia existed.6 5 The
Joint Commission accredited the hospital."
Thus, as late as 1978, the New Jersey state hospitals had never admit-
ted to a case of permanent drug-caused harm, although the number of
such cases was almost certainly in the thousands.17 These surveys and
audits were inadequate as if by design. They presumed that state doctors
recorded on charts what every informed person knew the doctors invaria-
bly ignored.
The reality behind the hospitals' surveys and reports came to light
when Dr. Crane, as an expert witness for the Rennie plaintiffs,6 8 per-
formed his own New Jersey survey. Dr. Crane testified that his results
showed that about twenty percent of the patients examined had mani-
fested clear-cut tardive dyskinesia symptoms. Further, not a single one of
the affected patients' charts contained a diagnosis of tardive dyskinesia.
In nearly all instances, the hospital chart simply ignored the patient's bi-
zarre movements. It was as if hospital physicians could not see what was
not only obvious, but eye-catching and grotesque. For example, one pa-
tient, according to Crane,
of age sixty had a variety of symptoms [of tardive dyskinesia],
very obvious ones, and this particular patient had, I would con-
sider it as-each condition being moderately severe, but since he
had various parts of the body involved, I would say the condition
was at least severe. He was receiving currently Thorazine, one
hundred milligrams three to four times a day. The physical on
admission, April 16, 1979 reported no neurologic findings, and I
can assure you that the symptoms could not have developed in
OS Id. at 266b.
0 Id.
"8 Trial Record exhibit D-63, Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979) [herein-
after cited as Trial Record].
"' Rennie, 462 F. Supp. at 1136.
17 See supra note 31 and accompanying text. The assumption is that 20% of the pa-
tients at New Jersey's four state hospitals were afflicted. See Rennie, 476 F. Supp. at 1299.
The state system's population being about 4,000 at any one time, it is obvious that many
more thousands of patients are admitted to a hospital and spend some time there during a
year. For Dr. Crane's testimony describing his findings, see Joint Appendix, supra note 38,
1065a-69a, 1081a-83a.
"8 See Joint Appendix, supra note 38, at 1065a-95a. As to Dr. Crane's findings on the
incidence of tardive dyskinesia, see id. at 1070a, 1074a, 1082a-83a.
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one month [i.e., between the physical and Dr. Crane's examina-
tion of the patient] ....
There were no findings pertaining to the neurological question
on admission and there was an AIMS [an examination designed
solely to detect and rate the severity of tardive dyskinesia], which
was found negative. 9
Another example was a patient with
dyskinesia, tremor, and a large number of symptoms, not only in
the mouth but in the whole body so that the patient had a very
bizarre . . . [gait] and very conspicious motor abnormality. On
admission, the patient had been put on Halodal [sic]. . . . This
was discontinued and . . . he is receiving now Lithium, which I
think is justified .... The only thing that was noted was in one
note that the patient had tremor, but nothing about tardive dys-
kinesia and his very diffused symptom[s] . . .7
In a very few cases, the patients received examinations by hospital neu-
rologists. However, the neurologists generally only described some symp-
toms; they did not diagnose tardive dyskinesia.
Mental hospitals are left with three remaining options upon their re-
fusal to acknowledge tardive dyskinesia. They can ignore the symptoms,
as Dr. Crane discovered. Hospitals also can attribute the movements to
faking. Finally, they can decide that mental illness itself, rather than the
drugs used to treat that illness, causes the problem. Although cases of
hospitals' recognizing the symptoms and using the "faking" or "mental
illness" excuses appear to be exceptional-Crane's survey found
none-such cases do exist; the appendices to this article describe three.
All reflect a firm unwillingness to admit to non-trivial, drug-caused
harms.
II. THE DOCTOR-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP: ATOMISTIc REMEDIES
When doctors' decision-making and judgment fall below acceptable
standards, or threaten to do so, it is natural to attempt medical remedies:
the doctors should be made more careful; their education should be im-
proved; and there should be medical checks on the work of individual
physicians. In any event, these are the considerations that have motivated
some courts in mental hospital drugging cases.
An examination of each of these approaches follows, with an emphasis
on the underlying judicial vision of the problem and the likely effective-
ness of the corresponding remedy.
" Id. at 1077a-78a.
'0 Id. at 1086a.
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A. Careful Medical Decision-Making
Two federal appellate courts have reached the merits of a state mental
hospital drugging dispute,7 1 and each has viewed the problem as one of
physician care and deliberateness in decision-making. That is, both courts
chose a remedy which, if fully implemented, would ensure that state phy-
sicians consciously and carefully deliberate about their individual drug
prescriptions."2
Undoubtedly, some drugging decisions in state hospitals are made care-
lessly, with doctors paying too little attention to the problem or the pa-
tient. Courts can discourage this kind of carelessness by requiring doctors
to listen to patients and actually deliberate over the decision to drug.
However, as the accounts of tardive dyskinesia in the appendices demon-
strate, 7 3 the principal problems of state drugging do not result from this
cause, and so they will not respond to this remedy.
Carelessness does not explain why state hospital physicians overlooked
the drug-induced physical movements that were consistently ignored in
charts. For example, in one case documented in Rennie, a man with se-
vere dyskinetic movements throughout his body and limbs was reported
by his doctors as having "normal" motor status.7 4 Profound mouth and
tongue movements in other patients were overlooked for years on end.7 5
In the case of John Rennie himself, symptoms that were visible to judges,
outside experts, other patients, hospital nurses, and even small children
could not be detected by state doctors despite repeated examinations.7 6
If the hospitals had merely been slow to detect tardive dyskinesia, first
noticing it months after onset, perhaps one might attribute the problem
to casual or careless observation. Even then, the staff's day-to-day expo-
sure to patients-feeding them, getting them out of bed, escorting them
from place to place-would make this explanation implausible. If doctors
were merely careless, rather than biased against reporting tardive dys-
kinesia, that disorder would be over- as well as under-diagnosed. How-
ever, state hospitals never acknowledge tardive dyskinesia, and random,
individual acts of carelessness simply cannot account for that oversight.
Even when carelessness has played a role in the non-acknowledgement
of tardive dyskinesia, other factors are also at work. In one patient's
7' Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc) vacated and remanded,
U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 3506 (1982); Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated and
remanded sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 2442.
72 See, e.g., Rennie, 653 F.2d at 847; Rogers, 634 F.2d at 657. See also Zlotnick, First Do
No Harm: Least Restrictive Alternative Analysis and the Right of Mental Patients to Re-fuse Treatment, 83 W. VA. L. REV. 375, 446 (1981) (legal procedures should ensure compli-
ance with medical norms).
71 See infra apps. A-C.
" See infra app. B.
71 See infra app. A.
71 See infra app. C.
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case 77-remarkable because the hospital neurologist had used the words
"tardive dyskinesia" (without actually making a definitive diagno-
sis)-the report of the neurologist was lost in the chart. Perhaps there
was haphazard hospital record keeping. However, the fate of that one re-
port is part of a larger pattern: any inference, fact, or record tending to
support the diagnosis of tardive dyskinesia was rejected, overlooked, or
rationalized away. Thus, doctors "blatantly ignored '7 8 this patient's man-
ifest symptoms for years. Indeed, losing the suggestive report was not
very different from the daily failure to record this woman's symptoms in
the chart; every day that doctors, nurses, and other employees failed to
acknowledge her abnormal movements represents another comparable ep-
isode. Although doctors managed not to lose a later, similar neurology
report, that made no difference; they still diagnosed the patient as a
"faker. '79 No neurology referral was required to support the "faking" di-
agnosis, just as no number of referrals could successfully establish a diag-
nosis of tardive dyskinesia.
Unfortunately, the patient's fate was typical. Far from being the result
of carelessness, the doctors' approach here was a predictable part of sys-
tematic hospital routine. Indeed, as to the principal plaintiff in Rennie,
John Rennie, hospital doctors were as careful as possible. Judge Brotman
had admonished them to take extra pains, and the medical director of the
hospital examined Mr. Rennie every week.80 However, the hospital took
care only to see that no report of drug side effects appeared in
Mr. Rennie's chart. A nurse who recorded his drug-related movements
was reprimanded for doing so,8 and every artifice was used to avoid re-
porting Mr. Rennie's tardive dyskinesia s2
Of course, the doctors' actions appear foolish, perhaps unsustainably
foolish, in retrospect. The physicians underestimated the fact-finding
processes of the courts and overestimated the weight that their own writ-
ten chart entries would carry. (After all, the failure to record tardive dys-
kinesia had led the New Jersey College of Medicine and Dentistry 3 and,
apparently, the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals" to sup-
pose that there was no tardive dyskinesia in New Jersey; why should
Judge Brotman be any different?) The doctors' litigation posture was un-
tenable and probably would not be repeated. But the diagnostic approach
toward Mr. Rennie was not an artifact of the litigation; it was the invari-
able rule, and it cannot be explained in terms of physician carelessness.
77 See infra app. A.
76 Rennie, 476 F. Supp. at 1302.
79 See infra app. A.
SO See infra app. C.
S Rennie, 476 F. Supp. at 1302.
63 See infra app. C.
83 See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
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Since carelessness is not behind the posture of state hospitals toward
tardive dyskinesia, the remedy of making doctors more careful will not
address the problem.
B. Continuing Medical Education
If state doctors are not careless about drugs, then perhaps the physi-
cians are badly trained and cannot recognize drug-caused harms. Were
that so, the obvious remedy would be better-educated doctors. Such ap-
proaches, entailing mandatory continuing medical education about drugs,
have proved popular with hospitals 5 and have appealed to courts.8 6
However, medical ignorance is no better than carelessness as an expla-
nation for the drug excesses of state psychiatry. It is true that many
mental hospital doctors may not know as much about drug side effects as
they should. Some gaps in their knowledge may even be remarkable. But
it cannot be said that every state physician is ignorant of, for example,
tardive dyskinesia, the most notorious side effect. Yet the pattern of non-
recognition-or, more precisely, non-acknowledgement-is nearly univer-
sal. Nor can lack of education explain why medical reviewing organiza-
tions," special medical-school review boards, 8 and supervising physi-
cians8" accepted reports of tardive dyskinesia's nonexistence and were
apparently pleased to receive them.
Many of the considerations that discredit the "carelessness" theory of
psychiatric excess9" also refute "lack of knowledge" theories. Like care-
lessness, medical ignorance would produce only random mistakes, unless
the ignorance were studied. Lack of medical training in state hospitals
does not explain why every other interpretation-faking, mental illness,
mistaken observation-has been preferred over the diagnosis of tardive
dyskinesia. Nor does it explain why doctors do not merely misdiagnose
tardive dyskinesia movements, but ignore them entirely.
Indeed, clinical ignorance of tardive dyskinesia does have a studied
quality. Doctors know precisely which movements to ignore. Moreover,
the alternative theories for grotesque movements-faking and mental ill-
ness-are highly implausible on their face, at least in many circum-
stances. The "faking" hypothesis requires that patients be fully informed
about tardive dyskinesia and be willing to perform difficult, and perhaps
impossible, voluntary tongue, muscle, and limb gyrations repeatedly dur-
ing every minute of their waking lives, reducing themselves to human cu-
riosities in the process: all to simulate a side effect that has never (so far
85 See, e.g., supra note 64 and accompanying text.
'0 See, e.g., Rone v. Fireman, 473 F. Supp. 95, 109 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
87 See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.88 See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
'9 See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
"0 See supra notes 71-84 and accompanying text.
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as the record indicates) caused any New Jersey state doctor to discon-
tinue drugging. Moreover, tardive dyskinesia movements themselves belie
the theories of the hospitals. One Rennie plaintiff's movements, for exam-
ple, were far too severe to be feigned, yet physicians and staff chose to
regard them as faking." Nor is tardive dyskinesia difficult to distinguish
from naturally occurring mental illness.2 It is not credible, for example,
that one patient's doctors really believed in schizophrenic "mannerisms"
of the diaphragm;9s the movements, along with distress in much of the
rest of the patient's body, had actually been induced by tardive dyskine-
sia. None of this is explicable in terms of lack of education on the doctors'
part or their ignorance of drug side effects.
While all state doctors may not be well versed about tardive dyskinesia,
the fact remains that if they do not know more, it is because they do not
want to know. Medical articles describing the entire array of drug side
effects-not just tardive dyskinesia-can be read by any lay person in an
hour or less. Since drugs constitute the preeminent psychiatric response
to mental illness and since tardive dyskinesia is their most notorious side
effect, the fact that doctors ostensibly require more education to notice
the disorder requires explanation.
The futility of requiring further medical education appears from John
Rennie's own treatment. The hospital medical director reviewed
Mr. Rennie's condition every week but did not recognize the classical
signs of tardive dyskinesia, even though each week the director indicated
on a pre-printed form that those very same symptoms were not present.94
Not even a description of the symptoms present in front of his eyes led
the medical director to acknowledge tardive dyskinesia. While it is re-
markable that the medical director did not know the basic tardive dys-
kinesia symptoms, it would be even more remarkable if further training
would have made a difference. When reading a list of symptoms contem-
poraneous with an examination is not enough, it is fair to conclude that
further education is futile. (Of course, the entire hospital medical staff
went along with the medical director's judgment.) Indeed, there are re-
ports that medical education regarding tardive dyskinesia has no effect
whatever on state doctors95-as it should not, since ignorance is not the
problem to begin with.
91 Rennie, 476 F. Supp. at 1301; see infra app. A.
92 Crane, Tardive Dyskinesia, supra note 38, at 218.
93 See infra app. B.
94 See infra app. C.
95 See, e.g., Crane, The Prevention of Tardive Dyskinesia, 134 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY, 756-
58 (1877) ("It is quite obvious that the publication of articles on tardive dyskinesia and the
pleas of a few concerned investigators to use neuroleptic drugs with greater discretion have
had little impact on the prescribing practices of physicians."); see also Joint Appendix,
supra note 38, at 1411a-13a, 1614a (testimony of Drs. Crane and Mosher).
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C. Peer Review and Chart Audits
Intra-hospital peer review is a remedy related to careful medical con-
sideration and improved physician education. Presumably, a peer review
mechanism would make doctors cautious about mistakes and would bring
a broader body of knowledge to bear on drugging decisions.
It is clear, however, that the problems described in the previous part
will not be alleviated by this remedy either. New Jersey doctors did col-
laborate on cases, even if they did not formally review each other's work,
but a second opinion never made any difference."' The doctors failed to
account for tardive dyskinesia individually and, when they joined to-
gether, they still took no account of it.
A variation on simple peer-review-one that uses chart audits to deter-
mine whether drug prescriptions conform to pre-determined, written
standards-appears more promising, and at least one court has endorsed
it.9 7 The formality and the use of written standards that mark these sys-
tems is appealing. However, chart audits in their current form actually
promise little, as an examination of the model audit standards 8 of the
American Psychiatric Association (A.P.A.) will demonstrate.
The purpose of the A.P.A.'s standards is "to permit a knowledgeable
nonphysician to select from a large number of cases a relatively small
number for which physician review is appropriate. . . . Charts are se-
lected for medical review."9 9 For example, one written standard stipulates
the diagnoses that should appear on the charts of patients who receive
neuroleptics and, if no such diagnosis appears, the chart is "selected for
medical review." But the standards do not purport to mean that charts
singled out for review reflect unacceptable practice. The medical re-
viewer-whether the prescribing physician or, more likely, another mem-
ber of the medical staff-could well conclude that, in the particular case
at hand, the drug prescription was acceptable. Lest there be any doubt on
this point, the A.P.A. has stated that it "strongly agrees with the AMA
and other speciality societies that only physician reviewers can make an
ultimate determination of the medical appropriateness or necessity of pa-
tient care in a particular case." 100 Thus, the system is simply one of peer
review, with the failings noted above.
The limitations of peer review notwithstanding, perhaps it would be
beneficial if doctors spoke to each other about their charts under the
guidance of written-if still advisory-standards. While that may be true,
9' For example, more than one doctor was almost always involved in Mr. Rennie's care.
See Rennie, 462 F. Supp. at 1138-40.
17 Rone v. Fireman, 473 F. Supp. 95, 109-10 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
9' Dorsey, Ayd, Cole, Klein, Simpson, Tupin & DiMascio, Psychopharmacological
Screening Criteria Development Project, 241 J.A.M.A. 1021, 1021 (1979).
99 Id.
100 Id.
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the design of the A.P.A. audit protocol and the problems noted in the
previous part bear little relationship to one another.
Some illustrations may prove helpful. In theory, a protocol might single
out for review a physician's charts if none of them contained the tardive
dyskinesia diagnosis; that would be a strong indication of the physician
ignoring that disease. But the A.P.A.'s chart protocol singles out charts
which contain a diagnosis of tardive dyskinesia.' °' Although no one could
quarrel with the need to think carefully about drugging someone who has
already developed a permanent, drug-induced disease, the A.P.A.'s stan-
dard is meaningless in state systems that do not acknowledge tardive dys-
kinesia in the first place. Indeed, the audit system would discourage that
diagnosis-if further discouragement were needed-because physicians
would want to avoid the added paperwork and scrutiny it entails. Simi-
larly, the criteria include acceptable drug dosage ranges,"0 2 but the stan-
dard psychiatric dosage range has caused the high incidence of tardive
dyskinesia that we now have. The protocol, as noted above, also limits
drugging to patients with certain diagnoses, but it is easy enough for doc-
tors to make the required diagnosis-indeed it is hard to believe that a
doctor about to drug someone would do otherwise.'0 3
The problem with chart audits is that they presuppose the truthfulness
and completeness of hospital chart entries-a mistaken assumption, at
least if the issue is tardive dyskinesia. Moreover, the audits suppose that
the physicians are indifferent as to whether drugs are used or not (so that
a diagnosis will be made without any thought given to the effect of that
diagnosis on the acceptability of drugging) and that they will not take
pains to avoid having their charts singled out. Given the practices de-
scribed above, both of these assumptions are also dubious.
Indeed, chart audits of the kind envisioned by the A.P.A. were carried
out repeatedly in the New Jersey hospitals involved in Rennie. These re-
views sought to determine whether tardive dyskinesia existed in the state;
as noted above, the reviewers invariably concluded from the absence of
any such diagnosis in patient charts that there was no tardive dyskine-
sia.' A system of chart audits of the kind envisioned by the A.P.A.
would only routinize such findings.
III. LEGAL GUARDIANSHIP
A completely different approach to drugging problems would strictly
apply the model of ordinary medical treatment and ordinary patient con-
sent. According to this view, a mental patient's refusal to accept treat-
'0' Id. at 1026.
102 Id.
103 See, e.g., Rosenhan, On Being Sane in Insane Places, 13 SANTA CLARA LAW. 379, 395-
96 (1973).
'" See supra notes 57 and 63 and accompanying text.
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ment, like any other patient's refusal, may be overridden only if the pa-
tient is incompetent. To determine whether that is the case, general
incompetency proceedings are instituted. If the patient has been declared
incompetent, he or she can be drugged with the guardian's consent;
should the guardian refuse, drugging is forbidden.
Like the remedies considered in Part II, this one is atomistic. It looks
to the doctor-patient relationship, narrowly conceived, for the source of
drugging problems and for the appropriate remedy. However, the guardi-
anship model has a different vision of that relationship: it regards "com-
petent consent" as an essential feature, where medical approaches, at
least in this area, generally do not.1"'
This difference has produced some of the criticism by psychiatrists of
the guardianship remedy, which does not ensure that the treatments
deemed best by doctors will be administered. Indeed, some authors point
out that the family may be appointed guardian and then oppose medica-
tion' 6-"a disturbing ethical as well as legal dilemma,"' 0 7 to these critics.
Psychiatrists also point out that guardianship proceedings often entail
long delays due to cumbersome legal procedures with patients remaining
undrugged in the meantime; that the procedures are expensive; that
guardians weaken the patient-doctor alliance by acting as middlemen;
that informed, competent guardians may well be unavailable; and that
the interference with the drug regime entailed by this remedy can cause
chaos on mental hospital wards.
These considerations are important ones, but is is difficult to assess
them in the abstract. There may or may not be readily available means
for expediting the proceedings or obtaining interlocutory relief; the ex-
pense may or may not exceed that of other measures, including systems
of medical peer review; the addition of middlemen may, in fact, help to
balance doctor-patient relationships in which the doctors hold all the
power and control every option; provision for competent guardians might
be made at reasonable cost; and chaos on the wards may or may not be
inevitable, 0 8 as charged.
1 See generally Gutheil, Shapiro & St. Clair, Legal Guardianship in Drug Refusal: An
Illusory Solution, 137, AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 347 (1980) (discussing the ways in which the
guardianship remedy in practice falls short of the medical ideal); Stone, supra note 26 (ar-
guing that physicians, not guardians, are best suited to make decisions as to treatment,
provided that the patient is initially adjudged incompetent).
100 Gutheil, Shapiro & St. Clair, supra note 105, at 350.
107 Id. (the other psychiatric criticisms noted in this paragraph also appear in the Gutheil,
Shapiro & St. Clair article).
10' Compare Stone, Recent Mental Health Litigation: A Critical Perspective, 134 Am. J.
PSYCHIATRY 273, 278 (1977) (in Rogers, this type of right-to-refuse-drug decree resulted in
"serious harm to both patients and staff") with Joseph, The Civil Rights of Mental Pa-
tients: A Case Study of the Legalities and Realities 61 (1976) (unpublished Masters thesis)
(reprinted in Trial Record, supra note 65, exhibit D-16 (the long-term impact of the court
decree in Rogers was modest)); see infra note 140 and accompanying text.
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The problems with guardianship remedies lie elsewhere. Drugging deci-
sions may be so personal, and their stakes so high, that even a duly-ap-
pointed guardian's inclination should not be binding. Indeed, for those
reasons the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has held that an adju-
dicated incompetent's refusal of drugs cannot be overridden by his guard-
ian;109 rather, a judge must decide whether the incompetent would
have-but for his incapacity-consented to drugging (the "substituted
judgment test").1 0 To the extent that guardians cannot consent, ap-
pointing them is futile; one must still decide whether to drug forcibly.
Another problem, aside from doctrinal nuances, is that guardians may
well be too quick to give consent.1 According to one report, many rela-
tives of patients oppose discontinuation of drugs even if physicians sug-
gest that course.1 2 Accordingly, when physicians urge drugging-as they
almost always do-the likelihood of guardian consent is high, no matter
what the consequences to the patient, and this is particularly true when
hospitals blame drug-caused harms on the patients' illnesses. Moreover,
state hospital staffs can unduly influence relative-guardians: they can, for
example, threaten to discharge the patient-who may well have no other
place to go-unless drugging is permitted; or relatives may be led to be-
lieve that staff will not care for undrugged patients.
There are additional problems. However the guardian may feel about
drugging, the process of his appointment and the mechanics of his deci-
sion-making are not designed to air drugging issues openly: guardianship
mechanisms operate too informally for that. It is arguable that state-
caused physical damage, inflicted via drugging, requires formal, open
processes of decision. If a patient's guardian consented to drugs, for ex-
ample, after the guardian had been informed that the patient needed
drugs and was feigning side effects or that he needed drugs and the bene-
fits outweighed any possibility of harm, it would be far from obvious that
the patient had received his due measure of consideration.
However, objections to the guardianship system's mechanics are proba-
bly less important than objections to its scope. Only patients acknowl-
edged in the first instance to be drug refusers are affected by such mea-
sures. Incompetent patients who consent to drugging will continue to be
drugged, as will patients (whether competent or not) whose drug objec-
tions the hospitals choose to ignore-and Rennie demonstrated that un-
'09 Guardianship of Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40, 55-56 (Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. 1981).
11 See, e.g., id. at 56. See the Epilogue to this article for a discussion of the result in
Mills v. Rogers, No. S-2995 (filed Dec. 15, 1983), on its remand to the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts.
. Compare supra note 106 and accompanying text.
"' Kurucz & Fallon, Dose Reduction and Discontinuation of Anti-Psychotic Medication,
31 Hosp. & COMM. PSYCHATAY 117, 117 (1980). In my practice, I noticed that relatives who
had once taken a neuroleptic were often sympathetic to a patient's drug refusal, while other
relatives generally were not.
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acknowledged drug refusers far outnumber the patients whose drug refus-
als hospitals acknowledged.11 s
To avoid these problems, one might canvass all patients for competence
and bring guardianship actions in all cases of putative incompetence
whether the person had consented to or refused drugs. But the number of
such cases would be phenomenally high, as there are many unadjudicated
incompetents in mental hospitals,"" and the administrative and financial
costs of the guardianship system would be multiplied many times over in
the process. Moreover, if the concern is with drugging as such, it would
seem wiser to tailor a remedy for that problem than to adopt the guardi-
anship mechanism-at greater cost in money, time, and energy-to the
peculiar context of mental hospitals and their drugs.
The actual impact of the guardianship remedy may be gauged from
Rogers v. Okin."5 In Rogers, a federal court order imposed the guardian-
ship rule on two wards of Boston State Hospital. The hospital could force
drugs only in emergencies or by obtaining a guardian's consent; the order
remained in effect five years before being overturned on appeal. 6
At the outset there was disruption, increased patient violence and dis-
order on the ward, and staff became demoralized."' However, ward rou-
tines soon returned to near normal, with the help of the "emergency"
exception. An investigatorils interviewed ward staff within a year and
reported:
By the time of the interviews, the Austin Unit seemed to have
quieted down somewhat. One month after the suit was brought,
the unit chief had felt that, "The buildiig was in bedlam." At the
time of our interviews, he commented that, "The last month or
two, things have been settling down." A number of subjects [i.e.,
members of the staff] shared this feeling, thinking that things
had cooled off lately, that the building was starting to return to
normal. ....
Several of the subjects commented on the direction they saw
the issue of the right to refuse treatment taking. One psychiatrist
resignedly stated that the suit "was a sobering, saddening experi-
ence leaving me wiser and less naive. Little was actually accom-
plished in terms of providing better patient care; the only thing
will be more red tape." Referring to the effect of the injunction,
Rennie, 476 F. Supp. at 1303-05.
31 See, e.g., id. at 1305; Appelbaum, Mirkin & Bateman, Empirical Assessment of Com-
petency to Consent to Psychiatric Hospitalization, 138 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1170 (1981).
.. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and
remanded, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded sub nom. Mills v. Rogers,
457 U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 2442 (1982).
" 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980).
1 Joseph, supra note 108, at 61.
Joseph, supra note 108.
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he noted that all instances of involuntary seclusion and medica-
tion must be accompanied by extensive documentation. Another
subject stated that, "The main difference between now and
before the suit is that the actions we take now require clear docu-
mentation." An attendant agreed, saying, "Staff is more account-
able now, which is good. People are putting more things in writ-
ing, and documenting more. This leads to better charts, and
makes things legally sound."' 9
This attendant perfectly expressed New Jersey physicians' attitudes to-
ward charts in Rennie. No heightened staff consciousness of drug side
effects seems to have come out of this experience. Furthermore, it ap-
pears that patients will have little relief under such a system, since, to
achieve it, patients will have to convince their doctors (or their guardians)
to respect their refusal of treatment when the state mental health care
system is committed to denying the harmful effects of drugs.
IV. DETERMINING INCOMPETENCE AT COMMITMENT HEARINGS
Doctor Alan Stone's proposal to confront treatment-refusal issues at
commitment hearings 1 20 represents an entirely different approach. Al-
though Stone's orientation is medical, his approach is also the first struc-
tural remedy to be explored.
Dr. Stone argues that inappropriate drug use is common in mental hos-
pitals both because untreatable patients may be admitted and because
treatment facilities may be ineffective. 1 2 ' These hospitals use drugs to
control patients.' 22 It follows that drug audits, careful physician atten-
tion, peer review, medical education, and similar measures cannot prevent
abuse of drugs; underlying circumstances compel drug abuse and compel-
ling necessity will corrupt reform measures.
Dr. Stone's views mark his proposal as "structural." He does not sup-
pose that the doctor-patient relationship can thrive in all circumstances
or operate free of institutional constraints. However, Stone's solution
does not address the attendant circumstances and constraints directly.
Rather he would prevent troubled doctor-patient relationships from ever
being formed in state hospitals via civil commitment.
Dr. Stone would have the underlying issues considered at commitment
hearings. Competent treatment (i.e. drug) refusers could not be commit-
ted; nor could patients be committed to facilities incapable of delivering
"I Id. at 84-85.
,s0 A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 66-70, 97-106 (1975);
see also Roth, A Commitment Law For Doctors, Patients and Lawyers, 136 AM. J. PSYCHIA-
TRY 1121 (1979) (a similar proposal).
"I A. STONE, supra note 120, at 19, 66-70.
122 See, e.g., Panel Discussion, Second Circuit Judicial Conference, Sept. 8-9, 1978, 82
F.R.D. 221, 271 (address by Dr. Stone).
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treatment. The result is that all properly committed persons could be for-
cibly drugged.
This elegant scheme has two components, which will be considered sep-
arately. (Stone's recent modifications 2 ' to his proposal will be explored
last.) First, the quality of the institution is supposed to provide assur-
ances of reasonable treatment; second, the commitment process is sup-
posed to afford patients an opportunity to be heard on competency ques-
tions, and by implication, drug questions as well. In the context of mental
hospital drugging, both components of Dr. Stone's proposal raise serious
practical issues. Despite its intentions, the proposal, as it is likely to be
implemented, would not ease and might even exacerbate drug problems
in state mental hospitals.
A. Upgrading Hospitals
First, it has not been established that "upgraded" hospitals heed their
patients' complaints about drug side effects or weigh drug harms seri-
ously. Substituting "better hospitals" for legal procedures may work to
some extent, but that is not self-evident, as the intervention of medical
school professors in the New Jersey tardive dyskinesia debate perhaps
demonstrated.124 Some excellent doctors may value freedom from
psychotic relapse more than freedom from tardive dyskinesia. Further-
more, the costs of the required hospital upgrading might be phenome-
nally high. These costs would be incurred at a time when there are serious
doubts concerning the power of the federal courts to order state expendi-
tures for such purposes.2 5
Such questions aside, it is doubtful whether courts or legislatures would
really bar patients from substandard mental hospitals either en masse or
on a case-by-case basis, as Stone suggests. Doing so would place danger-
ous and helpless persons "on the street" or in jail. If commitment was
otherwise in order, neither outcome would be acceptable. The public
would be jeopardized and patients would suffer. For similar reasons,
right-to-treatment courts have not ordered patients released from sub-
"" Stromberg & Stone, A Model State Law on Civil Commitment of the Mentally Il, 20
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 275, 330-35, 348-57; but see Stone, The Right to Refuse Treatment: WhyPsychiatrists Should and Can Make It Work, 38 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 358, 361-62 (1981).
224 See supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
125 See, e.g., New York State Assoc. for Retarded Children v. Carey, 631 F.2d 162 (2d Cir.
1980) (federal courts cannot hold governor in contempt for failure to expend funds); see also
Pennhurst State School and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) (White, J., dissenting in
part) (where receipt of federal funds is conditioned on compliance with federal standards,
the state retains the right to withdraw); New York State Assoc. for Retarded Children v.
Carey, 706 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1983) (substantial consideration must be given to public inter-
est and effect on state budget); cf. Rennie, 653 F.2d at 851 (district court order would im-
pose "substantial additional financial burdens" on the state).
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standard hospitals.'26
Further, it is doubtful that legislatures would enact such a commitment
law and then vote the necessary funds for upgrading hospitals. By enact-
ing the commitment law, legislatures put themselves in a bind: either vote
more funds for hospitals or face the politically unthinkable prospect of
causing state commitment mechanisms to self-destruct. If a legislature
desired either better hospitals or an end to patient commitments it could
act more directly, and with less political cost, to achieve the chosen goal.
Moreover, even if a commitment law were enacted in the proposed
form, the standards of care-and of adjudication, as well-inevitably
would be compromised in practice. Judges would face the unpleasant
prospect, already mentioned, of remitting dangerous or helpless persons
to the street. In practice, judges are likely to find any "treatment" satis-
factory under those circumstances. It is still less likely that judges will
decree a hospital generally substandard and foreclose all commitment.
Further, it is not clear what agency would have the resources, the inde-
pendence, or the interest to litigate such hospital-wide issues; I know of
none.
As a result of the pressures noted above, judicial decisions would
stretch the legal standards to suit the realities, ultimately upholding sub-
standard treatment. Little benefit would come from this exercise, and in
some respects it would even make things worse. The public might believe
hospitals had been reformed because of court decisions, when reformation
had not happened. In the unlikely event a hospital was deemed unsuited
for commitments, various devices-such as the threat of prison
terms-would inevitably be brought to bear in order to convince patients
to enter the hospital "voluntarily."' 27 It would be preferable to keep
things as they are; at least, compulsion should be openly and honestly
applied.
Further, even if patients were turned away from substandard hospitals,
the problem of what to do with them would remain. If these patients re-
ally would benefit from drugs, it would seem irrational not to administer
medication simply because the hospital was substandard. Many of these
people could conceivably be held in a jail, shelter, or other state facility
where, arguably, drugs should be used. However, the issues one avoided
I2' The court in the landmark right-to-treatment decision, Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d
451 (D.C. Cir. 1966), observed that "[ulnconditional or conditional release may be in order if
it appears that the opportunity for treatment has been exhausted or treatment is otherwise
inappropriate." Id. at 458. However, I know of no case-including Rouse itself-that re-
sulted in an otherwise commitable person's being released because of lack of treatment. See
also O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (declining to address the right-to-treat-
ment issues).
117 See, e.g., Gilboy & Schmidt, Voluntary Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, 66 Nw.
U.L. REV. 429 (1971) (individuals may be induced into voluntary commitment under threat
of involuntary commitment proceedings).
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by denying commitment would simply reappear-and be no less press-
ing-in these other contexts.
B. Evaluating Competence to Refuse
Even if the hospital is presumed adequate for treating the patient, seri-
ous practical problems remain.
Under Dr. Stone's original proposal, an incompetent person could not
be committed when a reasonable person might refuse the hospital's pro-
posed treatment. 28 Since competent drug-refusing patients would not be
committed even if the hospital's proposed treatment were reasonable, the
result, as already noted, is that everyone committed to a mental hospital
would be subject to forced drugging.
This proposal can have the effect of punishing both patients and soci-
ety at large for the mistakes or intransigence of the hospital. The problem
is that patients are excluded from mental hospitals based solely on their
disagreement with proposed treatment plans. An example will show the
possible consequences.
Suppose a former patient with a case of tardive dyskinesia and a his-
tory of tormented drug response becomes psychotic and dangerous
outside the hospital. Suppose also that, at the commitment hearing, the
hospital insists on drugging. The possibility is not far-fetched at all; New
Jersey hospitals, for example, insisted on administering drugs to
Mr. Rennie despite a similar psychotic and medical history. 2 9 Suppose
finally that the hypothetical patient refuses drugs. Although psychotic
and dangerous, this patient may well be coinpetent'3 0 and his decision to
refuse drugs well-founded. Indeed, any other decision might be prima fa-
cie incompetent, all other things being equal; and even if the patient is
incompetent, a reasonable person with his history might not accept drugs.
Under either assumption, according to Stone's proposal, commitment
should be denied. The problem with this outcome is that it burdens the
patient and the community because of hospital mistakes; both suffer (the
patient by being denied hospital care and the community by being ex-
posed to someone dangerous and mentally ill) so that the hospital can be
free of undruggable patients. That result serves no purpose except to aug-
ment the authority of the hospitals.
However, another consideration bears on the reasonableness of drug re-
fusal. A reasonable person may refuse a drug because it causes distress,
but refusal of the same drug may be unreasonable if it means that admis-
sion to the hospital will be denied. The patient may be dangerous and
face imprisonment. The patient may simply be helpless. In either case, a
well-founded drug refusal may be undercut by the drastic consequences
"18 A. STONE, supra note 120, at 67.
... Rennie, 476 F. Supp. at 1302-03; Rennie, 462 F. Supp. at 1140-41.
See A. STONE, supra note 120, at 69; Stone, supre note 123, at 359-60.
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of not being committed; what is "reasonable" depends as much on the
consequences of drug refusal as stipulated by Dr. Stone's proposal as on
the properties of the drugs themselves. At a minimum this situation will
result in strong pressures to accept the hospital's proposed treatment.
The patient may feel compelled to submit to drugs. His attorneys may
advise him to do so, considering the alternatives. If the patient persists in
refusing, the judge may be moved to find his refusal incompetent and
unreasonable. As noted, Dr. Stone's proposal may make an otherwise rea-
sonable refusal unreasonable.
The only party escaping these pressures is the hospital. It can be as
arbitrary as it likes. Indeed, mental hospitals may take advantage of their
position to propose draconian treatment programs for patients they are
reluctant to admit. This reluctance might be due to the difficulty of man-
aging the patient, the fact that the patient complains about hospital con-
ditions, or the fact that past drugging has brought the patient an early
case of tardive dyskinesia and the hospital does not wish to risk further
liability.
As a result of Dr. Stone's proposal, the authority of hospitals over pa-
tients would be augmented, their accountability to outsiders would be
lessened, and those who least deserve it would bear the burdens of hospi-
tal mistakes. The proposal flounders, I believe, for these reasons.
C. Competence Without Reasonableness
Doctor Stone's original proposal, as already noted, would allow incom-
petent patients to refuse treatments that a "reasonable man might re-
ject."1"1 In later articles, '1 32 however, Stone abandons this position. Stone
would now permit all involuntary patients to be drugged forcibly so long
as they had been found incompetent at their commitment hearings. 33
"Reasonableness" of refusal is no longer a factor. His new analysis in-
cludes a proviso that drugging be "consistent with good medical prac-
tice,'13 4 but there appears to be no regular forum where patients could
challenge drugging for that reason-it would not happen at commitment
hearings 3 5-and so hospital compliance with this standard is a moot
point.
One can only speculate about the reason for Stone's change of mind,
but it is not inconceivable that the acknowledged harshness of drug side
effects lies behind it. If Stone has come to believe that a reasonable man
"might" refuse drugs because of the danger of tardive dyskinesia, for ex-
ample, then forced drugging would be ruled out by the first proposal. To
13, A. STONE, supra note 120, at 67.
132 E.g., Stromberg & Stone, supra note 123.
"33 Id. at 330, 348.
131 Id. at 348.
130 Id. at 330.
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accommodate drugging, then, the "reasonable man" proviso must be
dropped.
However that may be, making patient incompetence a blanket license
for forcible drugging invites all the abuses described in Part II. Indeed,
the proposal does not even purport to restrict forced drugging in any way
previously-committed patients can enforce. The objections noted in con-
nection with the earlier proposal (except those directed at the "reasona-
bleness" provision) apply here as well; but in this version nothing at all
protects incompetents-who may need protection most-from the drug-
ging regimes of state psychiatry.
V. "INDEPENDENT" PSYCHIATRISTS: THE RENNIE DISTRICT COURT
DECREE
A different version of state drugging lay behind the district court's
Rennie injunction. ' There, institutional bias and loyalty were cast as the
villains.
District Judge Brotman deemed review of physicians' forced drug deci-
sions a constitutional necessity,"' but he disqualified the hospital medi-
cal director '3 8 and, by implication, other members of the hospital staff
from the reviewer's role. Judge Brotman found that staff physicians'
demonstrated loyalty to each other and to the hospital itself would pre-
vent unbiased judgments.3 9 As a solution, he decreed a system of "inde-
pendent psychiatrists"' comprised of non-state doctors hired by the
state department of mental health on a case-by-case basis to review
forced drugging episodes. In theory these doctors could render unbiased
decisions, free of the institutional taint that, in Judge Brotman's opinion,
distorted state doctors' drug judgments.'4 1
The outside physicians, who were "independent" only in the sense that
the state mental health department, rather than individual hospitals, em-
ployed them, would informally review"' each patient's case and then
render a binding decision. But the independents were not the only feature
of the decree: it also provided for written consent forms, " s emergency
drugging,' and drugging (without the necessity of independent review)
of patients whom state doctors deemed "functionally incompetent.' ' 4 5
Further, Judge Brotman also mandated a system of "patient advo-
, 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1978) (class injunction issued).
Id. at 1307; Rennie, 462 F. Supp. at 1145-47.
"' Rennie, 476 F. Supp. at 1310.
139 Id.
"o Id. at 1312, 1313-14.
"' Id. at 1310.
"' Id. at 1314.
"' Id. at 1313.
... Id. at 1313-14.
"' Id. at 1314.
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cates""' 6-nurses, social workers, or lawyers hired by the state mental
health department-who would assist patients in presenting their side of
drugging questions and who would also review cases of "functional incom-
petence.'1 47 The "patient advocate," but not the patient himself, could
obtain independent physician review of functional incompetents' drug re-
gimes."" The heart of the decree, however, was the independent
physician.
Unlike the approaches already considered, the "institutional bias" the-
ory includes an important non-medical component. Although improved
medical decision-making remains the goal, this approach regards medical
improvements as impossible without organizational changes. Thus, it is a
structural1 4 approach. It also represents a fresh view. For the first time,
doctors' hearts rather than their minds-or the quality of the institu-
tion-become the focus of legal concern. Further, the theory can plausibly
account for such phenomena as the failure of state doctors to notice their
patients' drug-caused disorders-a failure all but inexplicable as the
product of inadequate medical education or physician carelessness. 5 '
Nonetheless, as a explanation of what goes wrong in state drugging and
of what went wrong in Rennie, this institutional bias theory is flawed; its
account of the problem is incomplete and it mislocates the focal point of
state physicians' blind allegiance.
Perhaps state hospital medical directors hesitate to second-guess their
own staff physicians because of the superior's loyalty to his subordinates.
Still, that does not explain why the treating doctors themselves ignored
tardive dyskinesia in the first place. All the New Jersey doctors-whether
they were treating patients or reviewing other physicians' deci-
sions-proved unwilling to admit inconvenient facts that would threaten
future drugging. This conduct represents a kind of allegiance to drugging
per se, not loyalty to a hospital. However, if hospital loyalty is not the
source of the drug problems, bypassing the network of intra-hospital
friendship and professional association will not contribute to the solution.
More plausibly, perhaps, one might argue that state hospitals, as insti-
tutions, tend to administer drugs excessively, and the solution lies there-
fore in a drug decision-maker who is not associated with the hospitals. In
the Rennie injunction, that decision-maker is the "independent psychia-
trist." This argument, however, fails to explain why state hospitals drug
to excess in the first place. Without knowing that, one cannot predict
whether the "independent" psychiatrists will act "independently" of the
factors that cause drugging problems.
"6 Id. at 1313, 1314.
" ' Id. at 1314.
148 Id.
148 See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
150 See supra notes 71-84 and accompanying text.
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There is reason to doubt the performance of "independents." Whatever
has perverted the doctor-patient relationship and intra-hospital peer re-
view would seem likely to make similar inroads into this system of
"outside" medical consultants. Moreover, the state department of mental
health-which manages all the state hospitals-chooses the "independent
psychiatrists" (as well as the patient advocates).' 5 ' It seems improbable
that the head of the state hospital system could be immune to something
that influences every hospital that she supervises and all the hospital em-
ployees that she hires. Nor is this only speculation. The 1974 and 1978
surveys' 5 2 reporting no tardive dyskinesia in state hospitals were per-
formed by independent psychiatrists accountable to the department of
mental health.
The mechanics of independent psychiatrist review lead to similar pessi-
mistic conclusions. Although the district court decree styled the review as
a "hearing"1 53 and the Third Circuit called it an "adversary proceed-
ing," 5 4 nothing more than a traditional medical consultation is involved.
The "independent" must have access to medical records and see the pa-
tients. He will rely on charts prepared by the hospital and since the
charts are often voluminous, it will generally be necessary to accept the
treating physician's version of what the chart indicates. 55 Although the
"patient advocate" assists patients, there is no set hearing; the patient
advocates themselves may be nurses and social workers. This remedy re-
quires nothing more than that a psychiatrist with an unusual designation
perform an examination and speak with a non-physician hospital em-
ployee (the "advocate") about the case.
Moreover, independents will likely regard themselves as consultants
with functions subordinate to those of the treating physician. There is no
other role model for them. Given the powerful tradition of doctors' defer-
ring to other doctors and the complete absence of any sign-other than
legal jargon about "hearings"-that the independent ought to adopt a
different posture, it would be remarkable if the independent psychiatrist
were not extremely deferential. The "patient advocates" are subject to
parallel constraints, and as non-physicians in an institution where power
flows from credentials, they are doubly handicapped. Combine these con-
siderations with the prerogative of the state hospital system to hire and
fire "independents" or "advocates" and the likelihood of a realistic check
on state hospital drug decisions appears slight indeed.
These pessimistic conclusions are borne out by the experience of hospi-
tals and patients under Judge Brotman's decree (before the Third Circuit
Rennie, 476 F. Supp. at 1298, 1310.
I82 See supra notes 50-64 and accompanying text.
Rennie, 476 F. Supp. at 1314.
Rennie, 653 F.2d at 851.
See Rennie, 462 F. Supp. at 1148.
1983-84]
31Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1983
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
overturned it51 in July, 1981). The independent psychiatrists' "opinions,"
which Judge Brotman envisioned as reflective, revealing documents that
would address patients' medical and constitutional interests, were in fact
checkmarks on a hospital-supplied pre-printed form with, in most cases, a
few scribbled sentences added. 57 The independents saw themselves as
consultants reporting to treating physicians; it was customary, therefore,
for their remarks to be styled as "recommendations." Beyond considera-
tions of form, the sample of "opinions" I was able to examine'" reflected
the usual bias in favor of drugging. For example one of the very few in-
dependents to write an "opinion" as long as three-quarters of a page be-
gan his remarks as follows: "Patient is an eighteen year old white female
who is contradicting her need for medication." Not infrequently, the in-
dependent recommended higher dosages than the hospital thought advis-
able. There was also a tendency for the independents to suggest adding
more drugs-the independent's own preference plus the treating doctor's
choice, even though polypharmacy is generally frowned upon. In one in-
stance the patient was taking the neuroleptic Haldol and the independent
"recommended" the addition of two drugs of a different class one of
which, Lithium, is reported to be possibly toxic in combination with
Haldol. 159 This course was recommended because "pt. [patient] may be
salvagable [sic]."
Judging from their reports, the independents were hardly concerned
with side effects-these generally were not remarked upon-but in a few
cases, where independents took the trouble to provide some background
information, patient reactions were in some fashion mentioned. These
cases give a sense of how little patient distress ever weighed with the best
and most careful of the independents.
Judge Brotman had observed that drug refusers are often threatened
with Prolixin,160 which is notorious because it causes the most pro-
nounced side effects. Not surprisingly, many patients the independents
saw were receiving Prolixin; but no independent recommended a change
to a less obnoxious drug. As for individual side effects, one retarded,
lobotomized patient was rigid and drooling; the independent "recom-
mended" a drug that often alleviates those symptoms, but did not insist
on it and did not explore the hospital's failure to take that simple step.
Thus, doctors could continue drugging as before if they so chose. Signs of
tardive dyskinesia were tentatively noted in a few cases, but that issue
was not explored and consistent with past hospital practice there was no
firm diagnosis or mandatory follow-up. The independent simply recom-
16 Rennie, 653 F.2d 836.
'8 Sample of Independent Psychiatrists' Reports, Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294
(D.N.J. 1979).
158 Id.
159 1983 PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE 1756.
"' Rennie, 476 F. Supp. at 1304.
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mended evaluation by the hospital doctors.' 6 ' In another instance the in-
dependent himself casually evaluated a possible tardive dyskinesia case
without bothering to use standard instruments or to take the elemental
step of mandating a brief drug-free period. (True tardive dyskinesia
symptoms are briefly exacerbated by drug withdrawal, and this is a
means of testing for the disorder.)
These desultory exercises did not succeed in airing drug issues, assuring
patient dignity, or even adding to hospital deliberateness. They were
hardly what Judge Brotman envisioned and seem to have contributed lit-
tle besides weak, sometimes harmful recommendations which the hospi-
tals in all likelihood ignored.
The independents' performance was paralleled by that of the patient
advocates, whose role under the Rennie decree was to see that doctors
acknowledged patient refusals and set the review machinery in motion.
As noted previously, hospitals had bypassed the pre-Rennie, self-imposed
review system by the simple expedient of not admitting that drugs were
being forced.'6 2 It appears that the same practices continued. Indeed, by
the time the Third Circuit vacated Judge Brotman's injunction, this sys-
tem of over 4,000 patients was holding four "independent" drug reviews
per month-and it appears that many hospitals and wards reported no
refusals at all. 163
In sum, the Rennie decree was unlikely to succeed because of its lim-
ited vision of the drug problem. More information would be desirable, but
the decree's implementation was never studied. Thus, from all that is
known, the Rennie decree accomplished little.1 64
"I' In these three cases I have seen the independent's "opinion" but do not have those
documents in my possession. Nor, to my knowledge, are they part of the public record.
10 See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
'' Motion for Leave to File and Brief For the New Jersey Department of the Public
Advocate, Division of Mental Health Advocacy as Amicus Curiae In Support of Respon-
dents at 3C, Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. __ , 102 S. Ct. 2442 (1982).
I" Professor Brooks has maintained that Judge Brotman's decree "significantly im-
proved" the "administration of medication" in that "[tlhere is much less medication being
used . . . [and] fewer side effects" in New Jersey state hospitals. Brooks, supra note 13, at
213. "Nor have these improvements been accomplished at any significant cost to treatment
values," Brooks argued, since "treatment itself has improved" and no "substantial addi-
tional burdens [have] been placed on treatment personnel." Id.
I draw quite different conclusions because of the independents' and advocates' docu-
mented performance; indeed, Professor Brooks expressed doubts on those same points. Id.
at 199-201, 213. However, if the advocates and independents fail, the decree as a whole fails
with them. For information, Brooks seems to have relied on informants in the Department
of Mental Health, an organization whose knowledge-and/or candor-about drugging has
been consistently minimal. See, e.g., id. at 214. Thus hospital informants, based on their
previous performance, can hardly be relied upon. Like all students of the subject, Professor
Brooks is handicapped because no serious study of the Rennie decree-via litigation discov-
ery or otherwise-was ever undertaken. For what it is worth, informants known to me sug-
gest that the decree was unsuccessful in practice.
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CONCLUSION
Each of the four remedies studied is flawed by an overly-limited vision
of drugging problems. Medical deliberateness, hospital peer review, and
continuing medical education do not respond to what is actually wrong in
the hospitals, since carelessness, lack of medical consultation, and physi-
cian ignorance cannot account for the drugging practices noted in Part II.
Guardianship remedies on the Rogers district court model are not
promising because they fail to air drug issues, they are cumbersome,
and-like medical remedies-they ignore the actual methods of physician
overreaching. The least of what state physicians do wrong is override drug
refusals by competent patients.
Proposals to restrict commitment to incompetent, druggable patients at
viable treatment institutions 1) shift drugging problems to other social
contexts without resolving them; 2) mistakenly regard physician compe-
tence as a guarantee of just drugging; and 3) create powerful incentives
for judges, lawyers, and the public to overlook or disregard or make light
of drug-caused harms.
Judge Brotman's Rennie decree-though in my opinion a most
thoughtful attempt to resolve these issues-is flawed because state physi-
cians' obeisance to the principle of drugging the mentally ill regardless of
side effects is responsible for drugging abuses, rather than the hospital
allegiances that Judge Brotman cited.
If there is to be a right against state hospital overreaching via drugs,
other remedies-which reach more deeply into the structure of state psy-
chiatry-will be required to enforce it.
APPENDICES
As demonstrated by Dr. Crane's investigations and hospital surveys, '65
New Jersey doctors rarely took official notice of the symptoms of tardive
dyskinesia. However, the Rennie record includes a number of cases
where, due to unusual circumstances, doctors did briefly take notice, but
then attributed the patient's movements to "faking" or "mental illness."
Three such patient episodes are summarized below.
A. Elsie Sinke' 6"
Mrs. Sinke was a sixty-six-year-old, long-time mental patient whose
mouth and tongue were constantly writhing ' from an obvious case of
tardive dyskinesia. Her abnormal movements "jumped right out at
, See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
,6 Although she is not identified by name, see Rennie, 476 F. Supp. at 1031, for Judge
Brotman's findings as to Mrs. Sinke.
,17 Joint Appendix, supra note 38, at 2141a, 2144a, 2166a.
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you,"' 6 8 in the words of one Rennie expert witness.
Mrs. Sinke saw a hospital neurologist in 1975 because of her own com-
plaints about "difficulty in swallowing and talking."'' 9 The referring doc-
tors had noted that she exhibited "central facial weakness,' '17 0 a cryptic
observation that was as far as doctors would go in acknowledging her
drug-caused symptoms.
The neurologist reported that Mrs. Sinke's movements were in the
"classical tardive dyskinesia pattern."'' 7' Thus he did not commit himself
to any diagnosis, but simply reported what he saw. This report, which was
truly remarkable because it mentioned the words "tardive dyskinesia" (no
patient record called to the court's attention by either side in Rennie,
other than Mrs. Sinke's, contained the words), was then lost or ignored.
Drugging continued.
Thirteen months later, Mrs. Sinke was referred again to the neurolo-
gist, probably because of her own continued complaints. 72 Her docu-
mented, severe symptoms had been ignored for this entire period. The
neurologist responded to the referral by sending ward physicians another
copy of his original report which they duly filed without referring to its
findings. 173
Fourteen more months passed and still another ward physician, new to
her case, referred Mrs. Sinke to the hospital neurologist; the previous
findings had been forgotten. 174 Perhaps in frustration, the neurologist re-
plied that the patient had tardive dyskinesia175 Since Mrs. Sinke's case
was the only one in which the diagnosis was made, it provides a unique
insight into the hospital's response to documented tardive dyskinesia.
Less than a year later, doctors set about forcing neuroleptics on the
unwilling Mrs. Sinke. 176 Without any further neurological referral, they
diagnosed her tardive dyskinesia as "faking' ' 7 7 and proceeded to drug
her. The hospital did not hesitate to acknowledge the fact of her move-
ments, however, in explaining why she was dentureless: "The patient, ac-
cording to her, has been unable to control her mouth movements and a
denture fitting has been impossible.' 7
'6 Id. at 2160a.
169 Id. at 2144a-45a.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 2147a.
172 Id. at 2145a.
173 Id.
171 Id. at 2146a.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 2148a.
'77 Id. According to plaintiffs' expert witness, Mrs. Sinke's movements were too "gross"
too be feigned. Id. at 2149a.
178 Id.
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B. Annibale Ricuitti
Mr. Ricuitti was a fifty-three-year-old man who came to the hospital in
1977 depressed over separating from his wife. ' 79 Less than two years later,
Dr. Crane, the plaintiffs' expert, found him there, severely afflicted with
tardive dyskinesia. His jaw, tongue, arms, legs, torso, and diaphragm all
exhibited pronounced dyskinetic movements.' 8
His doctors did not notice these movements as they developed, or so it
appeared from the hospital chart. After approximately a year-it must
have required some explanation why a man as harmless as Mr. Ricuitti
had remained hospitalized that long-the following note was entered in
his chart:
Mr. Ricuitti was seen during a team evaluation today. His bodily
movements seem to be an embarassment [sic] for him and appear
to be chorealike movements. A neurological evaluation was sug-
gested. He had quit the workshop due, he said, to his bodily
movements interfering. I questioned him about being in the hos-
pital, he said he preferred to stay here, that he didn't feel that he
could handle the outside, especially with the bodily movements.
He has been on shopping trips with the Social Skills Program but
needs to have confidence built. .... 181
A physician's note for July 27, 1978 reports that the Ancora neurologist
saw Mr. Ricuitti and that "it is to be recognized" that Mr. Ricuitti's
problems could be "drug-induced."'1 82 The neurologist refrained from
making any diagnosis, as Mrs. Sinke's neurologist had refrained. Doctors
chose to regard Mr. Ricuitti's movements as "functional" '1 83 in na-
ture-that being another possibility mentioned by the neurolo-
gist-meaning that the movements were a manifestation of Mr. Ricuitti's
mental illness. Accordingly, the physicians continued neuroleptic drugs. 184
Four months later, the Ancora hospital records no longer even acknowl-
edged Mr. Ricuitti's dyskinetic movements; a doctor's summary of his
case in November 1978 indicated that Mr. Ricuitti's "motor activity" was
"normal."185
Mr. Ricuitti believes that his dyskinetic movements are the result of
nervousness; he does not know that neuroleptics caused them.88 This is
understandable when the hospital either refuses to acknowledge his
movements or attributes them to mental illness. Quite understandably,
... Id. at 1080a (Mr. Ricuitti is referred to as patient No. 102).
180 Id. at 1080a-81a.
'8' Id. at 568b.
182 Trial Record, supra note 65, exhibit p-77.
183 Id.
184 Id.
18 Joint Appendix, supra note 38, at 566b.
186 Trial Record, supra note 65, exhibit p-77.
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then, a hospital orderly wrote the following note in Mr. Ricuitti's chart
one night:
Res. [resident] usually sleeps all night. He doesn't shower in A.M.
He is very quiet usually only speaks when spoken to. Res. has a
moving motion at times which he says is from nerves. N/C [no
complaints] offered to this shift. . .. "'
C. John Rennie
Mr. Rennie's tardive dyskinesia was milder than Mrs. Sinke's or
Mr. Ricuitti's, but Judge Brotman had urged the hospital to monitor him
closely for the disorder.18 8 Nonetheless, the hospital declined to make the
diagnosis or-it appeared-to notice the movements of his tongue and
jaw.
Random movements of the fingers are often precursors of more obvious
tardive dyskinesia symptoms,8 9 and Mr. Rennie had manifested these in
December, 1977.190 However, his doctor labelled the movements "fak-
ing-"19 1-a poor attempt, she testified, at imitating a different side effect.
In subsequent months, as court hearings in the case continued,
Mr. Rennie's experts192 and hospital employees who lacked authority to
make chart entries noticed lip, tongue, and jaw movements. As revealed
by her later testimony, one hospital employee had observed that
Mr. Rennie's mouth would move in different directions and "his speech
would be slurred;" there was also a "quivering, wavy-like motion of his
tongue," which "sometimes" protruded from his mouth. '93 This employee
had "to holler at the other patients and tell them to stop making fun of
John. They would always ask what he was eating or why he was making
those funny faces. '" 94 Mr. Rennie was aware of this condition too, of
course. He testified in July, 1979 that:
A. I seem to a lot of times almost bite my tongue in half for
no conscious reason. I just do it all of a sudden. I just seem to
just-my tongue gets bit and my tongue is all chewed up at times.
Q. What about your jaw? Does that move?
A. I don't know if it moves much but the fact that I have to
187 Id.
i' Rennie, 462 F. Supp. at 1141, 1153.
189 AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, TARDIVE DYSKINESIA-REPORT OF THE APA TASK
FORCE ON LATE NEUROLOGICAL EFFECTS OF ANTI-PSYCHOTIC DRUGS, 23 (1979).
'90 Trial Record, supra note 65, Transcript of Testimony Volume III at 148 (testimony of
Dr. Bugaoan).
1 Id.
,' Joint Appendix, supra note 38, at 1080a, 1318a (testimony of Dr. Crane and
Dr. Dyson).
193 Id. at 131b (testimony of Mrs. Suelto).
,' Id. at 137a.
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grind my teeth, I bit my tongue a lot. That there frightens me.
Q. Now, going back in time, was there a time when your jaw
moved more than it does now?
A. Yes. I mean a time when people were constantly asking me
for chewing gum or something like that because they thought I
was chewing, you know, and it was just the unconscious move-
ment of my jaws. . . . In fact, sometimes, especially small chil-
dren, two and three and four-year olds, would ask me for gum, so
I knew they were seeing something that was [obvious to] . . . a
small kid.195
The attitude of Ancora physicians was described by a hospital nurse
who herself had observed "obvious" movements.1 98 After Mr. Rennie's at-
torneys had discussed the problem with her, she spoke with the treating
physician, Dr. Balita. But Dr. Balita would not acknowledge anything:
He [Dr. Balita] listen. . . [ed] to me and it was after a team meet-
ing. He had been there. I think in my mind I felt he saw
[Mr. Rennie's movements]. If he didn't see it, he didn't say he
didn't see it. He didn't say he did see it. We just-I just said it to
him and we left the room. 19 7
Dr. Balita never admitted the existence of Mr. Rennie's symptoms.
Nonetheless, Mr. Rennie had received especially close scrutiny from
the hospital because of his position in the litigation and Judge Brotman's
admonitions. Each week throughout 1979, the medical director examined
him. However, the medical director consistently reported that
Mr. Rennie showed no abnormal movements. 198
There was a second school of thought among hospital doctors, however.
This view held that Mr. Rennie did display tardive dyskinesia-like move-
ments, but that he was faking. 99 No acknowledgement of movements was
recorded in the chart, however; Ancora physicians only discussed this
possibility among themselves."'
The mental hospital had a third alternate position: Mr. Rennie dis-
played movements, and he was not faking. His movements, according to
this view, resulted from mental illness or psychological difficulties.20'
In his testimony, the hospital medical director spoke of these inconsis-
tent positions as viable alternatives: "If there were abnormal movements,
they. . . could have been a number of other things. "202 "I felt that if
Id. at 1211a-12a.
196 Id. at 124b.
"' Id. at 1363a-64a.
198 Rennie, 476 F. Supp. at 1302.
199 Joint Appendix, supra note 38, at 1343a.
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 Id. at 1342a.
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he were doing these movements or whatever it was part of his psychologi-
cal difficulties. 20 3
Upon cross-examination, it developed that the medical director had
seen strange movements all along, despite his chart entries to the con-
trary.2 4 When the medical director wrote, week after week, that there
were "no abnormal movements," he meant that there were bizarre move-
ments, but neuroleptic medication did not cause them. 05 What the direc-
tor actually saw was "the equivalent of a grimacing movement" by
Mr. Rennie.20 6 "[A] movement that would be as if he had silent speech;
movements similar . .. [to] the way some persons when they read they
almost mouth the words that they are reading. '20 7 He then testified that
these movements were not symptoms of tardive dyskinesia. 208
The medical director was wrong. Grimacing and mouth opening are
classical symptoms of tardive dyskinesia.2 09 Furthermore, the director
claimed to have performed the so-called "AIMS" examination of
Mr. Rennie.210 This involves looking at the examinee and rating him for
the presence and severity of movements that are listed on a form. This
AIMS form includes mouth opening and grimacing among the symptoms
of tardive dyskinesia.2 " However, Dr. Pepernik (the medical director)
found Mr. Rennie negative on all aspects of the AIMS examination.
Mr. Rennie received a second AIMS examination on June 6,
1979-one week before Dr. Crane found a mild-to-moderate dyskine-
sia.2 1 2 This AIMS examination was negative; it disclosed no grimacing, no
mouth opening, and none of the movements that Dr. Crane found and
that the medical director in fact saw. No one signed that AIMS examina-
tion. On a form specifically prepared for the litigation, an Ancora doctor
later explained that he disagreed with Dr. Crane's observations about
Mr. Rennie because the patient "was seen on 3 occasions in June, 1979
by Dr. Pepernik and no evidence of abnormal involuntary movements
noted by Dr. Pepernik.92 1"
EPILOGUE
I had completed work on this article when the Supreme Judicial Court
203 Id. at 1343a (emphasis added).
204 See supra note 198.
20 Joint Appendix, supra note 38, at 2307a-08a.
206 Id.
207 Id.
206 Id. at 2308a.
"' Joint Appendix, supra note 38, at 746b-47b (A.I.M.S. form).
210 Id.
211 Id.
2,2 Trial Record, supra note 65, exhibit J-1 (Mr. Rennie's hospital chart).
210 Id. exhibit D-70 (hospital reports).
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of Massachusetts decided Rogers in December, 1983.214 This latest Rogers
opinion deserves notice because it appears to be the most far-reaching of
the "right-to-refuse-drugs" decisions.
Starting from the premise that competent state mental patients can re-
fuse neuroleptic drug treatment,2 1 Justice Abrams went on to decide
that: 1) a judge-not an affiliated or even an "independent" physi-
cian-must ordinarily adjudicate hospital challenges to patient compe-
tence; 2) as a general rule, a patient adjudicated incompetent must be
allowed to refuse drugs, and indeed is barred from accepting drug treat-
ment,2"' unless the judge also determines that the patient, if competent,
would have consented to drugs (the "substituted judgment" test); 3) not-
withstanding (1) and (2) above, for a brief period drugs may be forced
upon a patient "whom doctors, in the exercise of their professional judg-
ment believe to be incompetent"21 7 if drugging promises to "avoid the
immediate, substantial and irreversible deterioration of a serious mental
illness,"2 1 provided that "if the patient objects" to continued drugging
doctors must then obtain an adjudication of incompetence and a judge's
"substituted judgment" decision; 4) in addition, drugs may be forced on
patients to prevent violence or maintain hospital order, but in such cases
"drug treatment is being administered for the benefit of others,"2 9 con-
stitutes chemical "restraint," and can be imposed only if: a) "a patient
poses an imminent threat of harm to himself or others;"22 b) no "less
intrusive alternative '"22 exists; and c) the statutory requirements of care-
ful documentation and medical monitoring are satisfied.
This approach resembles the "guardianship" remedies described in
Part I11.222 The main practical differences are 1) a judge, rather than a
guardian, makes the drugging decision on behalf of the incompetent pa-
tient; and 2) the judge must employ the "substituted judgment" test. Of
course, those who find simple guardianship remedies too cumbersome will
object even more strongly to the Supreme Judicial Court's decision, with
its "two-stage" legal procedure and its frank acknowledgement of values
higher than medical cure. At the same time, critics of the informality of
214 See supra note 1. Rogers was determined in the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court pursuant to the certification of nine questions by the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit. The certified questions dealt with the standards and procedures under
Massachusetts law for medicating involuntarily committed patients with antipsychotic
drugs.
2'6 Mills v. Rogers, No. S-2995, slip. op. at 12 n.15 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. Dec. 15, 1983).
210 Id. at 12 n.14.
217 Id. at 29.
218 Id. quoting Guardianship of Roe, Mass. Adv. Sh. 981, 1008 (Sup. Jud. Ct. 1981).
2'19 Id. at 25.
220 Id. at 27.
221 Id.
22 See supra notes 105-19 and accompanying text.
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guardians' decisions, 1 3 or the vulnerability of guardians to hospital sua-
sion and threats,22 will find "substituted judgment" determinations a
distinct improvement. In terms of this article's classification of remedies,
this one, like simple guardianship proposals, is atomistic. Here however,
the social atom belongs to the world of citizens' relations to other citizens,
not doctors' relations to patients. The court here is plumbing civic obliga-
tions, not medical ethics.
The test of the Massachusetts remedy will come in its actual applica-
tion. The day-in-day-out ability of judges to resist deferring to mental
hospital decision-making will be crucial. However, it is not premature to
point out that this remedy has some of the potentially crippling flaws of a
simple guardianship system. Only patients that the hospital acknowledges
as drug refusers receive any protection, and as pointed out above, hospi-
tals generally ignore patient reluctance about, or outright resistance to,
drugging 22 5
Moreover, a "patient's acceptance of antipsychotic drugs ordinarily
does not require judicial proceedings. 2 26 After a patient has been adjudi-
cated incompetent-that is, after an actual period of drug refusal that the
hospital is willing to acknowledge-"a substituted judgment by a judge
should be undertaken for the incompetent patient even if the patient ac-
cepts medical treatment.122 7 But incompetent drug acceptances go en-
tirely unchecked unless a patient has first incompetently refused and the
hospital has pursued incompetency proceedings. This distinction between
equally incompetent drug refusers is difficult to justify on its merits and
will have the added effect of further discouraging hospitals from acknowl-
edging patient drug refusers. Moreover, not all acknowledged acts of drug
refusal lead to court proceedings. Under the Rogers decision, as noted
above, doctors can forcibly drug patients to prevent "immediate, substan-
tial and irreversible deterioration of a serious mental illness." In that
event, court proceedings are required only if "the patient objects" after
the initial course of drugs. This represents a large loophole, however. The
length of that initial course of drugging is open to question. Many doctors
believe that a single moment of drug-free life invariably threatens the
requisite degree of deterioration in health. Patients would be warranted
in doubting their rights to refuse drugs after such an initial show of force
by the hospital.
A vociferous patient blessed with competent counsel may overcome
these obstacles and enjoy the benefits of Rogers, such as they are. How-
ever, few patients harmed by drugs will be so fortunate.
22 See supra note 242.
224 Id.
... See supra notes 242-43.
226 Rogers, slip. op. at 12 n.14.
227 Id.
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